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MARKOVIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND RELATED
FORWARD–BACKWARD SYSTEMS
By Umut C¸etin and Albina Danilova
London School of Economics and Political Science
This paper develops a new methodology for studying continuous-
time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically in-
formed agents. This approach allows us to lift the restriction of risk
neutrality imposed on market makers by the current literature. It
turns out that, when the market makers are risk averse, the optimal
strategies of the agents are solutions of a forward–backward system of
partial and stochastic differential equations. In particular, the price
set by the market makers solves a nonstandard “quadratic” back-
ward stochastic differential equation. The main result of the paper
is the existence of a Markovian solution to this forward–backward
system on an arbitrary time interval, which is obtained via a fixed-
point argument on the space of absolutely continuous distribution
functions. Moreover, the equilibrium obtained in this paper is able to
explain several stylized facts which are not captured by the current
asymmetric information models.
1. Introduction. In this paper, we address the long-standing open prob-
lem1 of existence of an equilibrium in a financial market with asymmetrically
informed traders and risk averse market makers in continuous-time with fi-
nite horizon. In such a market, the price of the traded asset is an equilibrium
outcome of a game between the market makers and an informed trader who
possesses superior information. Both market makers and the informed trader
choose their controls adapted to their filtrations. We assume that the market
makers obtain their information through their interactions with the traders
and have the obligation to absorb the total demand for the asset. Therefore,
their filtration is the one generated by the total demand process, Y . The in-
formed trader, on the other hand, has the filtration jointly generated by the
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1This problem was posed by Subrahmanyam in [40].
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market prices and her private information. In this game the market makers’
control is the price, S, while the control of the informed trader is her trading
strategy, X . Thus, the equilibrium price should satisfy the following condi-
tions: (i) the informed trader’s optimisation problem has a solution, and (ii)
given this solution, the price S fulfils the market makers’ objectives.2
The study of this game goes back to [29], which is the canonical model in
market microstructure theory for the analysis of strategic trading in the pres-
ence of private information (see [3, 14] and [37] for a review of Kyle’s model
as well as a discussion of its relationship with other market microstructure
models). Various extensions of the original model have been studied in the
literature; see, among others, [2, 4, 5, 8, 15, 17–19] and [28].
The original model and all these extensions assume that the market mak-
ers are risk-neutral and compete in a Bertrand fashion for the total demand
(see Section 12.C of [36] for the definition). This means that, in equilibrium,
the utility of any market maker is a martingale. Since the utility is linear,
this in turn implies that the optimal strategy for the market makers is to
set the price to be the conditional expectation of the fundamental value of
the asset given their filtration. In particular, in these models there is always
a unique price satisfying the objective of the market makers for any control
of the informed trader. Furthermore, the martingale property of the price
results in the optimal strategy of the informed trader being inconspicuous
in the equilibrium; that is, the law of Y in its own filtration is the same as
that of Y −X in its own filtration.
Whereas the risk-neutrality of the market makers makes the model tractable,
it is not consistent with the observed market behaviour. Indeed, there is a
vast empirical evidence that the market makers are risk averse and exercise
their control in a way that total demand mean reverts around a target level
at a speed determined by their risk aversion (see [24] and [33] for New York
Stock Exchange, [23] for London Stock Exchange, [12] for Foreign Exchange;
for a survey of related literature and results, see Sections 1.2 and 1.3 in [10]).
Although relaxing the assumption of market makers’ risk neutrality is
natural and has been prompted by the empirical evidence, there has been
only one attempt in the literature to investigate the effect of such an exten-
sion. Subrahmanyam in [40] considered a one-period model where market
makers with identical exponential utilities set the price that makes their
utilities martingales. This assumption is the direct analogue of the original
Kyle model discussed above in the context of risk averse market makers.
The tractability of the model considered in [40] relies on the fact that in a
2The focus of this paper is the equilibrium between the market makers and the strategic
informed trader as well as the resulting price. We do not study in depth the interaction
among the market makers faced with a given demand process. The reader is referred to the
recent manuscript of Bank and Kramkov [6] for an in-depth analysis of this interaction.
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one-period setting there exists an optimal response for the market makers
for any strategy of the insider. However, the existence of such responses is
uncertain in a multi-period setting. Indeed, Subrahmanyam noted that an
extension of his model to a multi-period setting is not possible due to the
strategic behaviour of the agents.
The aforementioned difficulty with the existence of an optimal response
for the market makers persists in continuous time. More precisely, given a
trading strategy of the informed trader, the optimal response of the market
makers is found via solving the backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE)
dSt = Zt dβt − c
2
YtZ
2
t dt,(1.1)
exp(cY1S1) = E[exp(cY1V )|FY1 ],(1.2)
where c > 0 is a constant, V is a bounded random variable representing the
fundamental value of the asset, Y is a given total demand process and β is a
Brownian motion with respect to FY – the filtration of the market makers
generated by Y . A solution to this BSDE is a pair (Z,S) of FY -adapted
processes satisfying (1.1) and (1.2). When this BSDE admits a solution, S
is the price that makes the utilities of the market makers martingales.
Although the terminal condition is unconventional, as Y and V are given,
the right-hand side of (1.2) is a fixed FY1 -measurable random variable. Thus,
we can rewrite the terminal condition as S1 = ξ, which is bounded due to
the boundedness of V . The form of the driver, on the other hand, poses a
real difficulty since the process Y multiplying Z2 is in general unbounded.
This renders the system (1.1)–(1.2) outside the realm of standard quadratic
BSDEs.
The price response of the market makers is only one side of the equi-
librium. To characterise an equilibrium, we also need to find the level of
total demand, Y , implied by the informed agent’s optimal trading strategy.
Consistent with the literature, we assume that the total demand is driven
by a Brownian motion and has a drift which is determined by the informed
trader. Hence, an equilibrium consists of (α,S), where α is the optimal drift
given S, and S satisfies the forward–backward stochastic differential equa-
tion (FBSDE)
dYt = dβt + αˆ(t, (Ys)s≤t)dt,(1.3)
dSt = Zt dβt − c
2
YtZ
2
t dt,(1.4)
exp(cY1S1) = E[exp(cY1V )|FY1 ],(1.5)
where αˆ is the FY -optional projection of α. It is well known that the exis-
tence of a solution for FBSDEs is quite delicate even when the driver is glob-
ally Lipschitz and satisfies a linear growth condition. Antonelli [1] showed
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the existence and uniqueness of a solution over a small time interval via a
fixed-point algorithm on a Banach space of processes. This result has been
extended by [22] and [20] to arbitrary time intervals by pasting solutions
obtained for small time intervals. An alternative technique for solving FB-
SDEs is the so-called four-step scheme introduced by [31], which requires
strong smoothness on the coefficients of the system and is based on the
link between quasi-linear partial differential equations. When the driver is
quadratic, the problem becomes more complicated and only few results are
available. Moreover, since available results originate from the solvability of
quadratic BSDEs, the standard assumption in the current literature is that
the driver is bounded by k(1+ z2) for some constant k (see, e.g., [25]). How-
ever, as (1.4) does not fit into the current paradigm of quadratic BSDEs,
these results are not applicable to our setting.
Despite these difficulties, we obtain a solution to this system with St =
H(t, Yt) for some smooth function H , when α is the optimal drift of the
informed trader given S. This solution provides a Markovian equilibrium
for the model that we consider. We show that in this case the system (1.3)–
(1.5) transforms into
Ht +
1
2
Hyy = 0,(1.6)
dYt = dβt − c
2
YtHy(t, Yt)dt,(1.7)
V
d
=H(1, Y1),(1.8)
provided Y has a smooth transition density, where the last equality is an
equality in distribution. This is still a forward–backward system of a forward
SDE and a backward PDE such that the terminal condition of the PDE
depends on the solution of the SDE, which in turn depends on H . This
coupling between the SDE and the PDE suggests a use of a fixed-point
algorithm.
Indeed, if we are given a continuous distribution for Y1, (1.8) yields a
function H(1, y), which is increasing in y. This allows us to obtain H(t, y)
via (1.6), and Y via (1.7). Hence, this procedure defines a mapping from the
space of distributions into itself. We show in Theorem 4.1, via Schauder’s
fixed-point theorem, that this mapping has a fixed point under the assump-
tion that V = f(η) for some increasing and bounded f satisfying some mild
regularity conditions, and a standard normal random variable η.
The validity of Schauder’s fixed-point theorem in our setting relies heavily
on the properties of solutions of (1.7) for any given function H satisfying
(1.6) with a bounded and increasing terminal condition. These properties
are explored in Lemmata 4.1–4.3. In particular, we obtain a remarkable
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connection between the laws of Y1 and that of Brownian motion. Namely,
we prove that
E[(Y1 − x)+]≥ E[(e−cCB1 − x)+]> 0,
E[(−x− Y1)+]≥ E[(−x− e−cCB1)+]> 0,
for all x > 0, where C is a constant that depends only on the bound on H .
We also show that Y has a smooth transition density.
The existence of solution to the system (1.6)–(1.8) ensures the existence
of a Markovian solution for the price process which makes the utilities of
market makers martingales once the drift of total demand, Y has the form
given in equation (1.7). However, in order for such a drift to appear in
equilibrium, it should be optimal for the insider to choose a drift whose
FY -optional projection has this form.
To this end, we establish in Proposition 3.1 that the sole criterion of
optimality for the insider is that the strategy fulfils the bridge condition
H(1, Y1) = V . Thus, if Markovian equilibrium exists, the equilibrium pair
(H,Y ) solves the system (1.6)–(1.8) and satisfies H(1, Y1) = V . The exis-
tence of such a pair is precisely the result of Theorem 5.1, which allows us
to establish the existence of the equilibrium in Theorem 5.2.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model we
consider while Section 3 is devoted to the (formal) derivation of the sys-
tem (1.6)–(1.8) and characterisation of the optimal strategy of the informed
trader. Section 4 establishes the existence of solution to the system (1.6)–
(1.8) and Section 5 proves the existence of the equilibrium. In Section 6, we
discuss the impact of risk aversion on the market behaviour in the equilib-
rium and explore the connections to the empirical literature.
2. Market structure. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,1],P) be a filtered probability
space satisfying the usual conditions of right continuity and P-completeness.
We suppose that F0 is not trivial and there exists an F0-measurable stan-
dard normal random variable, η. Moreover, the filtered probability space
also supports a standard Brownian motion, B, with B0 = 0, and thus, B
is independent of η. We define V := f(η) for some bounded and strictly
increasing function f with a continuous derivative.
As all the randomness in our model will depend only on V and B, we
shall take F = σ(N˜ , F˜), where F˜ is the minimal σ-field with respect to
which V and (Bt)t∈[0,1] are measurable and N˜ = {E : E ⊂ F for some F ∈
F˜ with P(F ) = 0}. Moreover, in view of the independence of V and B, we
may assume the existence of a family of probability measures, (Pv) such that
the disintegration formula
P(E) =
∫
f(R)
Pv(E)P(V ∈ dv)
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holds for all E ∈ F , and for all v ∈ f(R) the measure Pv satisfies Pv(E) =
P(E|V = v). The existence of such a family is easily justified when we con-
sider Ω = f(R)× C([0,1],R), where C([0,1],R) is the space of real valued
continuous functions on [0,1].
We consider a market in which the risk free interest rate is set to 0 and
a single risky asset is traded. The fundamental value of this asset equals V ,
which will be announced at time t= 1.
There are three types of agents that interact in this market:
(i) Liquidity traders who trade for reasons exogenous to the model and
whose cumulative demand at time t is given by σBt for some constant σ > 0.
(ii) A single informed trader, who knows V from time t= 0 onward, and
is risk neutral. We will call the informed trader insider in what follows and
denote her cumulative demand at time t by Xt. The filtration of the insider,
FI , is generated by observing the price of the risky asset and V . Thus,
an insider who has the information that V = v possesses the minimal right
continuous filtration generated by V and the price process, and completed
with the null sets of Pv .
(iii) Market makers observe only the net demand of the risky asset, Y =
X+σB, thus, their filtration, FM , is the minimal right-continuous filtration
generated by Y and completed with P-null sets. The number of market
makers is assumed to be N ≥ 2.
We also assume that the market makers have identical preferences de-
scribed by the common utility function, U(x) = −e−ρx, and compete in a
Bertrand fashion for the net demand of the risky asset. In case of several
market makers quoting the same winning price, we adopt the convention
that the total order is equally split among them.
Similar to [2], we assume that the market makers set the price of risky
security, S, as St =H(t, Yt) for some function H .
To understand the subtlety of the equilibrium derived later, it is important
to observe that an insider who is given the information that V = v has
the probability measure Pv on (Ω,F) while the probability measure of the
market makers is given by P, and these measures are singular with respect
to each other as Pv(V = v) = 1, whereas P(V = v) = 0 in our settings.
We now define admissibility of functions H for the market makers (which
will be called pricing rule in what follows) and admissibility of the trading
strategy of the insider. The conditions we impose are standard in the lit-
erature and were first introduced in [2]. The integrability conditions (2.1)
and (2.2) prevent the insider from following doubling strategies (see [2] for
the discussion). The absolute continuity of insider’s strategies is without
any loss of generality since strategies with a martingale component and/or
jumps are strictly suboptimal as shown in [2].
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Definition 2.1. A function H : R+ × R 7→ R is a pricing rule if H ∈
C1,2, strictly increasing in y and satisfies
EH2(1, σB1)<∞ and E
∫ 1
0
H2(t, σBt)dt <∞.(2.1)
The class of such functions is denoted with H.
Note that since any pricing rule is strictly monotone, B is adapted to FI .
The admissible strategies for the insider is defined in the following.
Definition 2.2. An insider strategy, X , is admissible for a given pricing
rule, H , if Xt =
∫ t
0 αs ds for some FI -progressively measurable α such that,
for all v ∈ f(R), we have Pv(∫ 10 |αs|ds <∞) = 1,
Ev
∫ 1
0
H2(t,Xt + σBt)dt <∞,(2.2)
and Ev[min{0,WX1 }] > −∞, where WX1 is the terminal wealth of insider
given by
WX1 :=
∫ 1
0
Xs dH(s,Ys)+X1(V −H(1, Y1)) =
∫ 1
0
(V −H(s,Ys))dXs.(2.3)
The class of admissible strategies for a given pricing rule H will be denoted
by A(H).
Observe that for any X of finite variation WX1 is well defined since V −
H(s,Xs) is a continuous process for any pricing rule, P
v-a.s.
The first term in (2.3) corresponds to continuous trading in the risky
asset, while the second term exists due to a potential discontinuity in the
asset price when the value becomes public knowledge at time t = 1. The
second expression for the wealth follows from integration by parts.
Given the definition of a pricing rule and admissible trading strategies,
we can now define an equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2.3. A pair (H∗,X∗) is an equilibrium if H∗ ∈ H, X∗ ∈
A(H∗), and
(i) given H∗, the insider’s strategy X∗ solves her optimisation problem:
Ev[WX
∗
1 ] = sup
X∈A(H∗)
Ev[WX1 ] ∀v ∈ f(R).
(ii) Given X∗, the pricing rule H∗ is such that the market makers’ wealth
satisfies zero-utility gain condition, that is, U(G) is a (FM ,P)-martingale,
where
Gt :=− 1
N
∫ t
0
Y ∗s dH
∗(s,Y ∗s ) + 1t=1
Y ∗1
N
(H∗(Y ∗1 ,1)− V ).(2.4)
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The above is the formulation of a Markovian Nash equilibrium in our
model. The condition for the optimality of insider’s strategy is a straight-
forward description of the best response of the insider for a given pricing
rule. The market makers’ optimality condition follows the tradition of Kyle
models where each market makers’ utility remains a martingale due to the
Bertrand competition among them. Indeed, suppose that one of the market
makers, say MMi, decides to deviate at some time t from this pricing rule
by, for example, selling at a higher price than H would suggest in order to
achieve a positive utility gain. However, the other market makers could then
offer to sell at a slightly lower price which would still allow them to make
a positive utility gain. Moreover, as this lower price is more favourable to
the traders, no one will trade with MMi eliminating any opportunities for
a utility gain. Deviation from the zero-utility gain condition by buying at
a lower price is also suboptimal for a similar reason. Clearly, buying (resp.,
selling) at a higher (resp., lower) price is suboptimal since it leads to a loss
in the utility. Thus, a pricing rule satisfying the zero-utility gain condition
is the best response of the market makers. The zero-utility gain condition
is also a direct continuous-time analogue of the concept of autarky utility
defining the equilibrium in the one-period Kyle model of [40] studying the
effects of the risk aversion of market makers on equilibrium. Recall that the
market makers are identical by assumption and, therefore, they offer the
same price quotes in equilibrium and the order is split equally among them
due to our order splitting convention when there are more than one winning
quote.
3. Characterisation of equilibrium. In this section, we show that a Marko-
vian equilibrium of this game is described by a forward–backward system
of stochastic and partial differential equations given by (1.6)–(1.8) by first
studying the optimal response of the market makers for a given strategy of
the insider, and then characterising the profit maximising strategies for the
insider. The heuristic arguments below which are used to characterise the
equilibrium will be made rigorous in subsequent sections.
Suppose that X is an admissible trading strategy of the insider so that Y
in its own filtration satisfies
dYt = σ dB
Y
t + αˆt dt,
where BY is an FM -Brownian motion and αˆ is the FM -optional projection
of α. The best response of the market makers is to choose a price, S, that
will satisfy the zero-utility gain condition. Let price S follow
dSt =Zt dB
Y
t + µt dt,
for some predictable process Z and an optional process µ that are to be de-
termined by the market makers. As there is a potential discrepancy between
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S1 and V , there is a possibility of a jump in the market makers’ wealth at
time 1. More precisely,
∆G1 =
Y1
N
(S1 − V ).
However, the zero-utility gain condition implies
1 = E
[
exp
(
−ρY1
N
(S1 − V )
)∣∣∣FM1
]
,
which is equivalent to
E
[
exp
(
ρY1
N
V
)∣∣∣FM1
]
= exp
(
ρY1
N
S1
)
.(3.1)
On the other hand, if we compute the dynamics of U(G) for t < 1 by Itoˆ’s
formula, we obtain
dU(Gt) = U(Gt)
ρ
N
Yt
{
σt dB
Y
t +
(
µt +
ρ
2N
Ytσ
2
t
)
dt
}
.
Reiterating the zero-utility gain condition for t < 1 shows that we must have
µt =− ρ
2N
YtZ
2
t .
Therefore, the zero-utility gain condition stipulates that the price S follows
dSt = Zt dB
Y
t −
ρ
2N
YtZ
2
t dt,(3.2)
and the market makers’ problem is to find (Z,S) to solve (3.2) with the
terminal condition (3.1) given the total demand process Y .
The BSDE in (3.2) is reminiscent of the quadratic BSDEs, which have
been studied extensively, and the connection of which to problems arising in
mathematical finance is well established (see, e.g., [7, 13, 27] and the refer-
ences therein). The essential deviation of (3.2) from the BSDEs considered
in these papers is that the coefficient of Z2t in (3.2) is
ρ
2N Yt, which is in gen-
eral unbounded. This makes the direct application of the results contained
in the current literature for quadratic BSDEs to (3.2) impossible.
However, if we turn to a Markovian equilibrium, that is, consider St =
H(t, Yt), it is natural to expect that in equilibrium αˆt = αˆt(t, Yt, St,Zt) for
some deterministic function αˆ so that
dYt = σ dB
Y
t + αˆ(t, Yt, St,Zt)dt.(3.3)
Thus, if a Markovian equilibrium can be attained it will provide a Markovian
solution to the FBSDE defined by (3.1)–(3.3), where αˆ is the optimal drift
chosen by the insider.
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We now turn to the optimisation problem for the insider when St =
H(t, Yt) for an admissible pricing rule H . Observe that from the point of
view of the insider the total demand process follows
dYt = σ dBt +αt dt,
for a given insider’s strategy Xt =
∫ t
0 αs ds. And the value function, Ψ, can
be defined as
Ψ(t, y) = sup
X∈A(H)
Ev
[∫ 1
t
(V −H(s,Ys))αs ds
∣∣∣Yt = y
]
.
Then, a formal application of the dynamic programming principle leads to
the HJB equation
Ψt +
σ2
2
Ψyy + sup
α
{α(Ψy + V −H)}= 0.
Since the term to be maximised is linear in α, the only way to ensure the
finiteness of solution is to set
Ψy =H − V,
which yields Ψt +
σ2
2 Ψyy = 0. Then, by straightforward calculations we see
that H must satisfy a backward heat equation
Ht +
σ2
2
Hyy = 0,
and, therefore, Itoˆ’s formula will yield that S should satisfy
dSt = σHy(t, Yt)dYt.
Combining this with (3.2) and (3.3) implies
z
σ
αˆ(t, y, s, z) =− ρ
2N
yz2,
that is,
αˆ(t, y, s, z) =− ρσ
2N
yz(3.4)
as soon as we note that z = σHy(t, y) by the choice of S.
The above form of αˆ is necessary in order for the market makers to quote
a Markovian pricing rule. However, in order for such αˆ to appear in equi-
librium, it should be optimal for the insider to choose a drift whose FM -
optional projection has this form. In Proposition 3.1, we will show that the
sole criterion of optimality for the insider is that the strategy fulfils the
bridge condition H(1, Y1) = V . Thus, if a Markovian equilibrium exists,
dYt = σ dB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt),(3.5)
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and H solves the backward heat equation above and satisfies H(1, Y1) = V .
As we show in Sections 4 and 3 a pair (H,Y ) satisfying the above condi-
tions exists for some admissible insider trading strategy and that it indeed
constitutes an equilibrium. In order to see that this equilibrium is indeed fea-
sible, suppose that we have a pair (H,Y ) which solves the following system
of equations:
Ht +
1
2
σ2Hyy = 0,(3.6)
dYt = σ dβt − σ
2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt)dt,(3.7)
V
d
=H(1, Y1),(3.8)
with Y0 = 0 where β is a Brownian motion on some given probability space
and Y is understood to be a strong solution of the forward SDE. Further
assume that the transition probability of Y possesses a smooth density, p.
Then the theory of filtration enlargements gives us (see Theorem 1.6 in [34])
that Y solves the SDE
dYt = σ dβ˜t +
{
σ2
py
p
(t, Yt; 1, Y1)− σ
2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt)
}
dt,(3.9)
where β˜ is a Brownian motion with respect to the natural filtration of Y ini-
tially enlarged with the random variable Y1 and, in particular, independent
of Y1. Thus, if V˜ is a random variable with the same distribution as V and
independent of β˜, we can replace Y1 with H
−1(1, V˜ ) in (3.9) and obtain the
SDE
dY˜t = σ dβ˜t +
{
σ2
py
p
(t, Y˜t; 1,H
−1(1, V˜ ))− σ
2ρ
2N
Y˜tHy(t, Y˜t)
}
dt.
Now, suppose that the solutions of this SDE are unique in law. Then Y˜ will
have the same law as Y , which yields in particular that Y˜1 =H
−1(1, V˜ ) and
in its own filtration Y˜ follows
dY˜t = σ dB
Y˜
t −
σ2ρ
2N
Y˜tHy(t, Y˜t)dt,
for some Brownian motion BY˜ .
The above discussion makes it clear what the optimal strategy of the
insider should be given H . Since V is independent of B, the optimal number
of shares of the risky asset held by the insider at time t equals∫ t
0
{
σ2
py
p
(s,Ys; 1,H
−1(1, V ))− σ
2ρ
2N
YsHy(s,Ys)
}
ds.
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This ensures that Y follows (3.5) in its own filtration and H(1, Y1) = V
achieving the optimality conditions for the insider as well as those for the
market makers.
These considerations imply that the question of existence of the equilib-
rium can be reduced to the problem of existence of a solution to the system
(3.6)–(3.8) with process Y admitting a smooth transition density. Despite
the apparent simplicity, the existence of a solution to this system is far from
being a trivial matter. Indeed, in order to determine H via the basic PDE in
(3.6), we first need to know its boundary condition. However, the boundary
condition for H , (3.8), requires the knowledge of the distribution of Y1 which
can only be determined if we know H . Thus, this problem is appropriate for
the employment of a fixed-point theorem which indeed yields the existence
of the solution as demonstrated in the next section.
We end this section by proving the optimality criteria for the insider that
we used in order to establish the above system.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose H is a pricing rule satisfying
Ht +
1
2σ
2Hyy = 0.(3.10)
If Xt =
∫ t
0 αs ds for some FI -progressively measurable α such that, for all
v ∈ f(R), we have Pv(∫ 10 |αs|ds <∞) = 1,
Ev
(∫ 1
0
H2(t,Xt + σBt)dt
)
<∞(3.11)
and
H(1,X1 +Z1) = V, P
v-a.s.,(3.12)
then X ∈A(H) and it is an optimal strategy for the insider.
Proof. We adapt the arguments in [2] and [41] to our case. Consider
the function
Ψ(t, y) :=
∫ y
ξ(t)
{H(t, u)− V }du+ 1
2
σ2
∫ 1
t
Hy(s, ξ(s))ds,(3.13)
where ξ(t) is the unique solution of H(t, ξ(t)) = V . Direct calculations show
Ψy(t, y) =H(t, y)− V(3.14)
and
Ψt +
σ2
2
Ψyy = 0.
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Therefore, from (3.14) and Itoˆ’s formula it follows that
Ψ(1, Y1)−Ψ(0,0) =
∫ 1
0
{H(t, Yt)− V }dYt
(3.15)
=−WX1 +
∫ 1
0
{H(t, Yt)− V }σ dBt
for any X such that Xt =
∫ t
0 αs ds with P
v(
∫ 1
0 |αs|ds <∞) = 1. Using (3.15)
and admissibility properties of X (see Definition 2.2), insider’s optimisation
problem becomes
sup
X∈A(H)
Ev[WX1 ] = sup
X∈A(H)
Ev
[∫ 1
0
(V −H(t, Yt))dXt
]
(3.16)
= Ev[Ψ(0,0)]− inf
X∈A(H)
Ev[Ψ(1, Y1)],(3.17)
where the last equality is due to (2.2).
Since Ψ(1, Y1) =
∫ Y1
ξ(1){H(1, u)− V }du is strictly positive unless Y1 = ξ(1)
as H(1, y) is strictly increasing, the conclusion will follow as soon as X is
shown to be admissible. In view of (3.15),
WX1 =Ψ(0,0) +
∫ 1
0
{H(t, Yt)− V }σ dBt,
and, therefore, the admissibility of X follows from (3.11). 
4. The main result and its proof. In this section, we state and prove the
main result of this paper that establishes the existence of a solution to the
system given by (3.6)–(3.8).
Theorem 4.1. There is a pair (H,Y ) that solves the system of equations
(3.6)–(3.8). Moreover, 0<Hy(t, y)≤C 1√1−t for all (t, y) ∈ [0,1)×R and for
some constant C. Furthermore, Y is the unique strong solution of (3.7) and
admits a regular transition density,3 p(s, y; t, z), for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ 1 and
(y, z) ∈R2 such that, for any fixed (t, z), p(s, y; t, z)> 0 on [0, t)×R and is
C1,2([0, t)×R).
We will prove this theorem by an application of Schauder’s fixed-point
theorem. Observe that if we start with an absolutely continuous probability
measure on R with full support, (3.8) yields an increasing function H(1, ·),
which defines an H solving (3.6). If we then plug this function into the SDE
3See the last paragraph on page 76 of [35] for a definition.
14 U. C¸ETIN AND A. DANILOVA
of (3.7), we arrive at a new probability measure on R associated with the
distribution of Y1. This procedure defines a transformation from the space
of probability measures on R into itself. Application of Schauder’s fixed-
point theorem requires a suitable choice of a closed and convex subset, D,
of probability measures on R such that the above transformation maps D
into itself and satisfies the conditions of Schauder’s fixed-point theorem.
Before we present the proof of the fixed-point result, we collect some useful
facts on the behaviour of the solutions of (3.7) in the following lemmata. The
first lemma observes a striking relationship between the time 1 laws of the
solutions of (3.7) and that of Bσ2 . An immediate consequence of this lemma
is that the law of Y1, where Y is the solution of (3.7) for a given H , has
a full support on R. This property allows us to compute the law of Y1 via
a Girsanov transform using the law of B1, which is achieved in the second
lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose H ∈C1,2([0,1)×R) satisfies 0≤Hy(t, y)≤C 1√1−t
for all (t, y) ∈ [0,1)×R, and some constant C. Let c≥ 0 be a constant, then
the stochastic differential equation
dYt = σ dBt − cYtHy(t, Yt)dt(4.1)
has a unique strong solution on [0,1]. Moreover, for any x > 0,
E[(Y1 − x)+]≥ E[(e−2cCBσ2 − x)+]> 0,(4.2)
E[(−x− Y1)+]≥ E[(−x− e−2cCBσ2)+]> 0,(4.3)
and, in particular, P(Y1 ≤ y) ∈ (0,1) for all y ∈R.
Proof. Since yHy(t, y) is locally Lipschitz on [0, T ]×R for any T < 1,
the above equation has a unique strong solution on [0, T ] upto an explosion
time τ . Since T is arbitrary this implies the existence of a unique continuous
strong solution on [0,1 ∧ τ). Let τn := inf{t ∈ [0,1) : |Yt| > n} and observe
that τn ↑ τ , a.s. Moreover, for any t ∈ [0,1]
Y 2t∧τn = 2
∫ t∧τn
0
Ysσ dBs − 2c
∫ t∧τn
0
Y 2s Hy(s,Ys)ds+ σ
2(t ∧ τn)
≤ 2
∫ t∧τn
0
Ysσ dBs + σ
2(t ∧ τn).
Thus, by Itoˆ’s isometry and the elementary inequality x≤ 1 + x2,
E[Y 2t∧τn ]≤ 1 + σ2 + 4σ2
∫ t
0
E[Y 2s 1[s<τn]]ds≤ 1 + σ2 + 4σ2
∫ t
0
E[Y 2s∧τn ]ds.
Therefore, Gronwall’s inequality yields E[Y 2t∧τn ]≤ (1+σ2)e4σ
2
for all t ∈ [0,1]
and n≥ 1. Thus, (Yt∧τn)n≥1 is uniformly integrable, and consequently, P(τ <
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t) = 0 and E[Y 2t ] ≤ (1 + σ2)e4σ
2
for all t ∈ [0,1], that is, Y never explodes
and the SDE has a nonexploding strong solution.
To obtain the estimates (4.2) and (4.3), let
Y˜t = Yt exp
(
c
∫ t
0
Hy(s,Ys)ds
)
and observe that
Y˜t =
∫ t
0
exp
(
c
∫ s
0
Hy(r,Yr)dr
)
σ dBs.
Thus, Y˜t =WTt for some Brownian motion W and the time change Tt sat-
isfying
σ2t≤ Tt = σ2
∫ t
0
exp
(
2c
∫ s
0
Hy(r,Yr)dr
)
ds≤ σ2 exp(4cC)t.
Thus, by the optional sampling theorem, for any K ∈R we have
E[(Y˜1 −K)+] = E[(WT1 −K)+]≥ E[(Wσ2 −K)+]> 0,
E[(K − Y˜1)+] = E[(K −WT1)+]≥ E[(K −Wσ2)+]> 0,
which implies (4.2) and (4.3). 
Lemma 4.2. Let h be a bounded, nondecreasing, and absolutely continu-
ous function, which is not constant. Consider the solution, H , of (3.6) with
the terminal condition h. Then |H(t, ·)| ≤ ‖h‖∞ for t≤ 1, and 0<Hy(t, ·)≤
C 1√
1−t for t < 1, where C =
√
2
σ2pi
‖h‖∞. Consequently, there exists a unique,
strong solution, Y , of (4.1) and, for any bounded and continuous function g
and T ≤ 1, we have
E[g(YT )] = E
Q[g(σWT )MT ],
where W is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,1],Q)
and (Mt)t∈[0,1] is a strictly positive ((F˜t),Q)-martingale given by
Mt := exp
(
−c
∫ t
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs − c
2
2
∫ t
0
W 2sH
2
y (s,σWs)ds
)
,(4.4)
with c being the constant from Lemma 4.1. Furthermore, Q-a.s., M1 ≤ e2cC ,
and ∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs
∣∣∣∣≤K(1 + |Wτ |)≤K(1 +W ∗1 ),(4.5)
where τ is any stopping time with respect to the natural filtration of W such
that τ ≤ 1, Q-a.s., W ∗t = sups≤t |Ws|, and K is some constant that depends
only on σ and ‖h‖∞.
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Proof. Observe that
H(t, y) =
∫
R
h(z)q(σ2(1− t), z − y)dz,
where q(t, x) is the probability density of a normal random variable with
mean 0 and variance t. Then, clearly, |H(t, y)| ≤ ∫
R
|h(z)|q(σ2(1 − t), z −
y)dz ≤ ‖h‖∞. Moreover, Hy(t, y) is strictly positive whenever t < 1. Indeed,
differentiating above, we have
Hy(t, y) =
∫
R
h(z)qy(σ
2(1− t), z − y)dz =
∫
R
q(σ2(1− t), z − y)dh(z)> 0.
On the other hand,
Hy(t, y) =
∫
R
h(z)
z − y
σ2(1− t)q(σ
2(1− t), z − y)dz
(4.6)
≤ sup
z∈R
h(z)
∫
R
|z − y|
σ2(1− t)q(σ
2(1− t), z − y)dz ≤C 1√
1− t ,
where C = ‖h(z)‖∞
√
2
σ2pi
. Hence, Lemma 4.1 implies the existence and the
uniqueness of a strong solution to (4.1).
Next, we will characterise the distribution of Y on [0, T ] for T < 1 by con-
structing a weak solution to (4.1) via a Girsanov transform. To this end, let
W be a Brownian motion on some filtered probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , (F˜t)t∈[0,1],
Q). Then M is a martingale on [0, T ] by Corollary 3.5.16 in [26]. Thus, if
we define P˜ on (Ω˜, F˜) by d˜P/dQ =MT , σW solves (4.1) under P˜ on [0, T ].
Due to the uniqueness in law of the solutions of (4.1), for any continuous
and bounded function g we therefore have
EP˜[g(YT )] =E
Q[g(σWT )MT ].
We next aim to extend the above equality to T = 1, which would follow
from the dominated convergence theorem once we demonstrate that M is a
bounded martingale. Direct calculations lead to
MT = exp
(
B(T,σWT )
+ c
∫ T
0
{
Hy(s,σWs)− 1
2
Hy(s,0)− c
2
W 2sH
2
y (s,σWs)
}
ds
)
,
where
B(t, y) =− c
σ2
∫ y
0
xHy(t, x)dx≤ 0(4.7)
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since Hy is positive. Thus, for any t≤ T ,
Mt ≤ exp
(
c
∫ 1
0
Hy(s,σWs)ds
)
≤ e2cC(4.8)
implying
EP˜[g(Y1)] = E
Q[g(σW1)M1],
where M1 := limT→1MT .
Our next goal is to prove the estimate in (4.5) which will, in turn, imply
that M1 is strictly positive. Let τ be a stopping time with respect to the
natural filtration of W and bounded by 1. Then
c
∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs
∣∣∣∣≤ |B(τ, σWτ )|+ c
∫ τ
0
∣∣∣∣Hy(s,σWs)− 12Hy(s,0)
∣∣∣∣ds
≤ |B(τ, σWτ )|+ 3cC,
where B(t, y) is given by (4.7). A simple application of integration by parts
on B(t, y) yields that |B(t, y)| ≤ 2cσ2 |y|‖h‖∞. Hence,∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs
∣∣∣∣≤K(1 + |Wτ |)≤K(1 +W ∗1 ),
for some K that depends on σ and ‖h‖∞ only.
The above estimate also shows that c
∫ t
0 WsHy(s,σWs)dWs is a square
integrable martingale on [0,1] with
c2
∫ 1
0
EQ[W 2s (Hy(s,σWs))
2]ds≤ 2c2K2(1 +EQ(W ∗1 )2)<∞.
As {ω :M1(ω) = 0} ⊆ {ω :
∫ 1
0 W
2
s (ω)(Hy(s,σWs(ω)))
2 ds =∞}, this yields
that M is strictly positive on [0,1], Q-a.s. and
M1 = exp
(
−c
∫ 1
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs − c
2
2
∫ 1
0
W 2sH
2
y (s,σWs)ds
)
.

Next lemma is not needed for the fixed-point algorithm that we will con-
sider in order to show the existence of a solution to the system (3.6)–(3.8).
On the other hand, it shows that any solution to (3.7) has a smooth transi-
tion density, which is necessary to construct the equilibrium in our model.
Lemma 4.3. Let h be a nonconstant, bounded, nondecreasing, absolutely
continuous function, the derivative of which is bounded on compacts. Con-
sider the solution, H , of (3.6) with the terminal condition h. Then the unique
strong solution, Y , of (4.1) admits a regular transition density p(s, y; t, z) for
all 0≤ s≤ t≤ 1 for (y, z) ∈R2. Moreover, for any fixed (t, z), p(s, y; t, z)> 0
on [0, t)×R and is C1,2([0, t)×R).
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Proof. Due to the Lemma 4.2, we have 0<Hy(t, y)≤C 1√1−t for t < 1
and y ∈ R, where H is the solution of (3.6) with the terminal condition h,
and C =
√
2
σ2pi
‖h‖∞. Furthermore, there exists a unique the solution, Y , to
(3.7) and for any bounded function g and 0≤ t < u≤ 1,
E[g(Yu)|Yt = y]
= EQ
[
g(σWu) exp
(
−c
∫ u
t
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs
− c
2
2
∫ t
0
W 2sH
2
y (s,σWs)ds
)∣∣∣Wt = y
σ
]
.
Thus, a regular transition density of Y can be defined as
p(t, y;u, z) = q(σ2(u− t), z − y)r(t, y;u, z), 0≤ t < u≤ 1,(4.9)
where
r(t, y;u, z)
:= EQ
y→z
t→u
[
exp
(
− c
σ2
∫ u
t
YsHy(s,Ys)dYs(4.10)
− c
2
2σ2
∫ u
t
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)ds
)]
,
with Yσ being a Brownian bridge from
y
σ to
z
σ on the interval [t, u] under
measure Qy→zt→u . Indeed, the representation (4.9) holds once we show that r
is a measurable function and Chapman–Kolmogorov equations hold. In fact,
as we show below r is continuous with respect to all its parameters, hence,
measurable (the easy task of validating Chapman–Kolmogorov equation is
left to the reader).
First, observe that the Itoˆ formula and the PDE (3.6) satisfied by H yield
[recall that B(t, y) is given by (4.7)]
eB(t,y)−B(u,z)r(t, y;u, z)
= EQ
y→z
t→u
[
exp
(
c
∫ u
t
{
Hy(s,Ys)− 1
2
Hy(s,0)− c
2σ2
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)
}
ds
)]
(4.11)
= exp
(
− c
2
∫ u
t
Hy(s,0)ds
)
×EQy→zt→u
[
exp
(
c
∫ u
t
{
Hy(s,Ys)− c
2σ2
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)
}
ds
)]
.
Moreover, in view of the SDE representation of Brownian bridges (see Sec-
tion 5.6.B in [26]), the law of Y under Qy→zt→u is the same as that of Y˜ under
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Q, where
Y˜s := y
u− s
u− t + z
s− t
u− t + σ(u− s)
∫ s
t
dWr
u− r , s ∈ [t, u].
Therefore,
EQ
y→z
t→u
[
exp
(
c
∫ u
t
{
Hy(s,Ys)− c
2σ2
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)
}
ds
)]
= EQ
[
exp
(
c
∫ u
t
{
Hy(s, Y˜s)− c
2σ2
Y˜ 2s H
2
y (s, Y˜s)
}
ds
)]
,
and the desired continuity follows from the continuity of Y˜ with respect to
(t, y, u, z) and the dominated convergence theorem that applies due to the
bounds on Hy.
In order to show that r(t, y;u, z)> 0 for all u≤ 1, it suffices to show that
Q
y→z
t→u
(∫ u
t
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)ds <∞
)
= 1.(4.12)
Indeed, due the uniform bounds on Hy, the nonnegative random variable in-
side the conditional expectation in (4.11) is zero only if
∫ u
t Y
2
s H
2
y (s,Ys)ds=
∞. To this end, fix an ω and observe that Kt,u := supt≤s≤u Y 2s satisfies
Q
y→z
t→u (0<Kt,u <∞) = 1. Therefore,
1
4Kt,u
∫ u
t
Y 2s H
2
y (s,Ys)ds≤
1
4
∫ u
t
H2y (s,Ys)ds
=
1
4
∫ u
t
(∫
R
h′(z)q(σ2(1− s), z − Ys)dz
)2
ds
≤
∫ u
t
(∫ 1
−1
h′(z + Ys)q(σ2(1− s), z)dz
)2
ds
+
∫ u
t
(∫ ∞
1
h′(z + Ys)q(σ2(1− s), z)dz
)2
ds
+
∫ u
t
(∫ −1
−∞
h′(z + Ys)q(σ2(1− s), z)dz
)2
ds.
Observe that, for the fixed ω, Y is a continuous function of time and, there-
fore, takes values in a compact set, which implies that h′(z+Ys) is bounded
for z ∈ [−1,1] and all s ∈ [t, u]. This implies that the first integral is finite
since
∫ 1
−1 q(σ
2(1− s), z)dz < 1.
To see the finiteness of the second integral, apply integration by parts to
get∫ u
t
(
−h˜(1+Ys)q(σ2(1−s),1)+
∫ ∞
1
h˜(z+Ys)
z
σ2(1− s)q(σ
2(1−s), z)dz
)2
ds,
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where h˜= h+ ‖h‖∞. Note that h˜ is positive, therefore, the above integral is
bounded from above by
8‖h‖2∞
∫ u
t
q2(σ2(1− s),1)ds <∞.
The third integral can be shown to be finite in the same way.
In order to show that p(t, y;u, z) ∈C1,2([0, u)×R) for fixed (u, z), where
u < 1, we will show that it is the fundamental solution of a parabolic differen-
tial equation (see page 3 of [21] for the definition of fundamental solutions).
In view of the relationship between the fundamental solutions of PDEs and
transition densities of diffusion processes (see the discussion following Defi-
nition 5.7.9 in [26]), let us consider the PDE
ut +
1
2σ
2uyy − cyHyuy = 0(4.13)
on the interval [0, T ] where T < 1. The existence of a fundamental solution
to this PDE will follow from Theorem 1 in [9] once we show that conditions
(i)–(iii) on page 28 of [9] are satisfied. Condition (i) is trivially satisfied for
σ being a constant. Moreover, since∣∣∣∣ ∂∂yyHy
∣∣∣∣= |Hy + yHyy|
and Hy(t, y) ≤ C 1√1−T for all (t, y) ∈ [0, T ] × R, we can conclude that the
function ∂∂yyHy is locally bounded if Hyy can be shown to be bounded in
(t, y) when y belongs to a bounded interval. Indeed, by directly differentiat-
ing H we obtain
|Hyy| ≤ 1
σ2(1− t)
(∫
R
|H(1, z)|q(σ2(1− t), z − y)dz
+
∫
R
|H(1, z)| (z − y)
2
σ2(1− t)q(σ
2(1− t), z − y)dz
)
≤ 2 ‖h(z)‖∞
σ2(1− T ) ,
that is, Hyy is uniformly bounded on [0, T ]×R. Thus, we have shown that
condition (ii) was satisfied. Since the constant functions solve the (4.13),
condition (iii) is satisfied as well; thus, a fundamental solution, Γ(t, y; s, z)
to (4.13) exists. In particular, if one considers this PDE with the boundary
condition u(T, y) = g(y) for some bounded g, the solution is given by
u(t, y) =
∫
R
g(z)Γ(t, y;T, z)dz.
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On the other hand, since the SDE (4.1) satisfies the hypotheses of Theo-
rem 5.7.6 in [26] on the time interval [0, T ], u has the following stochastic
representation by this theorem:
u(t, y) = E[g(YT )|Yt = y] =
∫
R
g(z)p(t, y;T, z)dz.
Thus, ∫
R
g(z)p(t, y;T, z)dz =
∫
R
g(z)Γ(t, y;T, z)dz,
and since g is arbitrary and both Γ and p are continuous in their parameters,
we deduce p(t, y;T, z) = Γ(t, y;T, z) for all 0≤ t < T < 1, and thus, it is C1,2
on [0, T )×R for T < 1.
To show that p(t, y; 1, z) is C1,2 on [0,1)×R for each z consider (4.13) with
the boundary condition u(T, y) = p(T, y; 1, z). Note that u(T, y) is bounded
in y since, due to (4.11), we have
r(t, y;u, z)≤ e2cCe−B(t,y) = e2cCe(c/σ2)(yH(t,y)−
∫ y
0
H(t,x)dx)
(4.14)
≤ e2cCe(c‖h‖∞/σ2)|y|,
where the first inequality is due to bounds on Hy(t, y) and the last one
due to the bounds on H(t, y) obtained in Lemma 4.2. Thus, there exists
a unique classical solution, u(t, y), to (4.13), with the boundary condition
u(T, y) = p(T, y; 1, z), given by
u(t, y) =
∫
R
p(t, y;T,x)p(T,x; 1, z)dx
by the definition of fundamental solutions. However, by Chapman–Kolmogorov
equations, ∫
R
p(t, y;T,x)p(T,x; 1, z)dx= p(t, y; 1, z),(4.15)
which in turn yields that p(t, y; 1, z) ∈C1,2([0, T )×R). Since T is arbitrary,
we have p(t, y; 1, z) ∈C1,2([0,1)×R). 
Having collected all the prerequisites, we can now prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. In the setting of Lemma 4.2, M defines an
equivalent change of measure between the laws of Y and σW . Thus, if we
define r(y) by [see (4.10)]
r(y) := r(0,0; 1, y) = EQ
[
M1
∣∣∣W1 = y
σ
]
,(4.16)
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then
E[g(Y1)] =
∫
R
g(y)q(σ2, y)r(y)dy
and, therefore, the probability density of Y1 under P is given by
q(σ2, y)r(y)≤ q(σ2, y)e2cC .(4.17)
The existence of a solution to the system of equations (3.6)–(3.8) will be
shown via a fixed-point argument applied to a certain operator mapping a
class of distribution functions on R into itself.
Schauder’s fixed-point theorem (see Theorem 7.1.2 in [21]) states that if
D is a closed convex subset of a Banach space and T :D 7→D is a continuous
operator, then it has a fixed point if the space TD is precompact, that is,
every sequence in TD has a subsequence which converges to some element
of the Banach space. In order to apply this theorem, we first need to find a
suitable Banach space which contains a class of probability distribution func-
tions on R that is large enough to contain the distribution of Y1 where Y is
one of the components of the solution to the system of equations (3.6)–(3.8).
In view of the above discussion, the distribution of Y1 will be continuous, in
fact it will admit a density. Thus, we may take Cb(R), the space of bounded
continuous functions on R, equipped with the sup norm as our underlying
Banach space and set P as the space of absolutely continuous distribution
functions on R, that is, P ∈ P if P is increasing, P (−∞) = 0, P (∞) = 1,
and there exists a measurable function P ′ such that P (y) =
∫ y
−∞P
′(z)dz.
Then we can define the set
D =
{
P ∈ P : P ′(z)≤C∗q(σ2, z),∀z ∈R,
∫ ∞
x
(y − x)P ′(y)dy ≥ E
[(
1
C∗
Wσ2 − x
)+]
,∀x> 0,
−
∫ −x
−∞
(y + x)P ′(y)dy ≥ E
[(
−x− 1
C∗
Wσ2
)+]
,∀x> 0
}
,
where
C∗ := exp
(
ρ‖f(z)‖∞
N
√
2
pi
σ
)
.
The reason for this judicious choice of C∗ will become apparent when we
define the operator T . We will prove the existence of a fixed point in four
steps.
Step 1: D is a closed convex set. It is clear that D is convex. To see it
is also closed, suppose that Pn is a sequence of elements in D converging
to some element, P , of the Banach space in the sup norm. Clearly, P is
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increasing with P (−∞) = 0 and P (∞) = 1. Moreover, for any x≤ y in R, it
follows from Fatou’s lemma that
0≤ P (y)− P (x) = lim
n→∞
∫ y
x
P ′n(z)dz ≤
∫ y
x
lim sup
n→∞
P ′n(z)dz,
since each P ′n is bounded from above by the same integrable function, which
in turn is an upper bound to the positive function limsupn→∞P ′n. However,
this implies that P is absolutely continuous and, in particular, there exists
a function P ′ with 0≤ P ′(z)≤ lim supn→∞P ′n(z)≤C∗q(σ2, z) for all z ∈R.
To complete the proof that D is closed, we need to show∫ ∞
x
(y − x)P ′(y)dy ≥ EQ
[(
1
C∗
Wσ2 − x
)+]
∀x > 0.
Since Pn converges P weakly, there exists a probability space supporting
random variables (Yn)n≥0 and Y such that Yn→ Y , a.s., Yn has distribution
Pn, and Y has distribution P . Note that one can directly verify that∫
R
(y − x)2Pn(dy)≤C∗E[(Wσ2 − x)2],
which shows the uniform integrability of the sequence (Yn−x)+. Therefore,∫ ∞
x
(y − x)P (dy) = lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
x
(y − x)Pn(dy)≥ E
[(
1
C∗
Wσ2 − x
)+]
.
Similar arguments show the other inequality. Thus, D is closed.
Step 2: Defining the operator T . For any P ∈D, let H : [0,1]×R 7→R be
the unique function which solves the following boundary value problem:
Ht +
σ2
2
Hyy = 0,
(4.18)
H(1, y) = f(Φ−1(P (y))),
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal ran-
dom variable. Observe that h(z) := f(Φ−1(P (z))) is a bounded, increasing
function. Moreover, its derivative given by f ′(Φ−1(P (y)))(Φ−1)′(P (y))P ′(y)
is well defined for all y ∈ R as P (y) ∈ (0,1) for all P ∈D and y ∈ R and,
therefore, h is also absolutely continuous. Thus, by Lemma 4.2, for all t < 1,
0 < Hy(t, y) ≤ C 1√1−t , where C =
√
2
σ2pi
‖f‖∞ is independent of the choice
of P .
To this H one can associate a unique process Y which solves (4.1) for
c= σ
2ρ
2N and Y1 is a continuous random variable with the probability density
q(σ2, y)r(y), where r is defined in (4.16). Thus, we can define
TP (y) =
∫ y
−∞
q(σ2, z)r(z)dz.
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Note that TP belongs to D due to (4.2), (4.3) and (4.17).
Step 3: T is precompact. Since TD is an equicontinuous family of func-
tions, by a version of the Ascoli–Arzela theorem (see Corollary III.3.3 in
[30]), if Pn is a sequence in TD then it admits a subsequence which con-
verges pointwise to P ∈ Cb(R). Moreover, this convergence is uniform on
every compact subset of R. This would mean that TD is precompact once
we show that the convergence is uniform over all R.
To do so, let us assume without loss of generality that Pn itself is the
convergent subsequence and consider any ε > 0. Due to the definition of D,
there exist x∗ and x∗ such that
Pn(x)≤C∗
∫ x
−∞
q(σ2, y)dy ≤C∗
∫ x∗
−∞
q(σ2, y)dy
=C∗Φ(x∗)≤ ε
6
∀x≤ x∗;
1−Pn(x)≤C∗
∫ ∞
x
q(σ2, y)dy ≤C∗
∫ ∞
x∗
q(σ2, y)dy
=C∗Φ(−x∗)≤ ε
6
∀x≥ x∗.
Since Pn converges to P pointwise, we also have with the same x
∗ and x∗
that
P (x)≤ ε
4
∀x≤ x∗; 1− P (x)≤ ε
4
∀x≥ x∗.
Since the convergence is uniform on the compact [x∗, x∗], there exist a K
such that for all n≥K
sup
x∈[x∗,x∗]
|Pn(x)− P (x)| ≤ ε
3
.
Thus, for any n≥K we have
sup
x∈R
|Pn(x)−P (x)| ≤ sup
x∈[x∗,x∗]
|Pn(x)− P (x)|+ sup
x∈(−∞,x∗]
(Pn(x) + P (x))
+ sup
x∈[x∗,∞)
(1−Pn(x) + 1− P (x))≤ ε.
Thus, we have shown that the convergence of Pn to P is uniform on R,
that is, TD is precompact in Cb(R) equipped with the sup norm. Hence,
Schauder’s fixed-point theorem yields T has a fixed point provided T is a
continuous operator, which we show next.
Step 4: T is continuous. To this end, let (Pn)n≥1 ⊂D converge to P ∈D
in the sup norm. As TPn and TP belong to D, in view of Problem 14.8(c)
in [11], pointwise convergence of TPn to TP will imply uniform convergence
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since TP is continuous. To each Pn and P , we can associate functions H
n
and H , Bn and B [see (4.7)], and the processesMn andM from Lemma 4.2.
Pointwise convergence of TPn to TP will follow immediately once we can
show that for any continuous and bounded function g
lim
n→∞E
Q[g(σW1)M
n
1 ] = E
Q[g(σW1)M1].
In view of the uniform bound on Mn and M due to (4.8), the above conver-
gence will hold if we can show that Mn1 converges to M1 in Q-probability.
In order to get the estimates to prove this convergence, first note that,
due to Lemma 4.2 for any stopping time, τ , bounded by 1, we have
c
∣∣∣∣
∫ τ
0
WsH
n
y (s,σWs)dWs
∣∣∣∣≤K(1 + |Wτ |)≤K(1 +W ∗1 ),
for some K independent of n. This shows that c
∫ t
0 WsH
n
y (s,σWs)dWs is a
square integrable martingale on [0,1] with
c2
∫ 1
0
EQ[W 2s (H
n
y (s,σWs))
2]ds≤K(1 +EQ(W ∗1 )2),
where K is a constant independent of n. Let
Nnt :=
∫ t
0
Ws{Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)}dWs.
Since [recall that B(t, y) is given by (4.7)]
−c
∫ 1
0
WsHy(s,σWs)dWs =B(1, σW1)+c
∫ 1
0
{
Hy(s,σWs)− 1
2
Hy(s,0)
}
ds,
integrating Bn and B by parts we obtain
cNn1 =
c
σ
W1(H
n(1, σW1)−H(1, σW1))− c
σ2
∫ σW1
0
{Hn(1, y)−H(1, y)}dy
+ c
∫ 1
0
{Hy(s,σWs)−Hny (s,σWs)}ds−
c
2
∫ 1
0
{Hy(s,0)−Hny (s,0)}ds.
As Hn are uniformly bounded and Hny ≤ C 1√1−t for t < 1, if we can show
that Hn(1, y)→H(1, y) and Hny (t, y)→Hy(t, y) for all y ∈R and t ∈ [0,1),
the above will immediately imply that Nn1 converges to 0, Q-a.s. Moreover,
it will also imply convergence in Lp(Q) for all p ∈ [1,∞) in view of the bound
obtained in (4.5). In particular, we will have
lim
n→∞E
Q
[∫ 1
0
W 2s {Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)}2 ds
]
= 0.(4.19)
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Thus,
lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
W 2s {Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)}2 ds= 0 in Q-probability.
(4.20)
Moreover,∫ 1
0
W 2s |Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)|Hy(s,σWs)ds
≤
∫ 1
0
W 2s {Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)}2 ds
∫ 1
0
W 2s (Hy(s,σWs))
2 ds,
which in turn [since due to (4.5),
∫ 1
0 W
2
s (Hy(s,σWs))
2 ds <∞ Q-a.s.] implies
lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
W 2s {Hny (s,σWs)−Hy(s,σWs)}Hy(s,σWs)ds= 0
(4.21)
in Q-probability.
Combining (4.20) and (4.21), we can deduce that
lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
W 2s (H
n
y (s,σWs))
2 ds=
∫ 1
0
W 2s (Hy(s,σWs))
2 ds in Q-probability.
Together with Nn1 → 0, Q-a.s. the above implies Mn1 →M1, Q-probability.
Thus, it remains to show that Hn(1, y)→H(1, y) and Hny (t, y)→Hy(t, y)
for all y ∈R and t ∈ [0,1). Indeed, limn→∞Hn(1, y) = limn→∞ f(Φ−1(Pn(y))) =
f(Φ−1(P (y))) in view of the continuity of f ◦Φ−1 on (0,1) and the fact that
the sequence (Pn(y)) converges to a limit P (y) ∈ (0,1) for any y ∈R due to
the definition of D.
Next, observe that for t < 1
|Hny (t, y)−Hy(t, y)|
≤
∫
R
|Hn(1, z + y)−H(1, z + y)| |z|
σ2(1− t)q(σ
2(1− t), z)dz.
As Hn and H are bounded by ‖f‖∞, the convergence to 0 follows from the
dominated convergence theorem and that Hn(1, y)→H(1, y) as n→∞.
Thus, we have verified that T is continuous operator, D is a closed and
convex subset of a Banach space and TD is precompact. Therefore, by
Schauder’s fixed-point theorem, T has a fixed point P , that is, TP = P .
For this P , define H as the solution to (4.18) and Y as the correspond-
ing unique solution to (3.7). Then (H,Y ) is the solution to the system of
equations (3.6)–(3.8).
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To complete the proof of the theorem, we need to show that the solution
to (3.7) has a transition density with the required smoothness and posi-
tivity properties. This follows from the Lemma 4.3 once we observe that
h(z) := f(Φ−1(P (z))) satisfies the required conditions. It is obvious that h
is bounded (since f is), nonconstant and nondecreasing (as f , Φ and P are).
Moreover, h′(y) = f ′(Φ−1(P (y)))(Φ−1)′(P (y))P ′(y), is well defined for all
y ∈R as P (y) ∈ (0,1) for all P ∈D and y ∈R and, therefore, h is absolutely
continuous. Let K ⊂R be a compact, then since P is continuous, P (z) ∈K1
for all z ∈K, where K1 ⊂ (0,1) is also a compact. As Φ−1 ∈C1((0,1)), this
implies that (Φ−1)′(P (y)) is bounded for all y ∈K. Similarly, f ′(Φ−1(P (y)))
is bounded for all y ∈K. As boundedness of P ′ follows from the fact that
P ∈D, this yields that h′ is bounded on compacts and, therefore, satisfies
the conditions of Lemma 4.3. 
5. Construction of the equilibrium. Suppose H is the function deter-
mined in Theorem 4.1. As briefly discussed in Section 3, if we can identify
an admissible strategy X such that: (i) α̂ is given by −σ2ρ2N YtHy(t, Yt), and
(ii) X1 satisfies (3.12), then (H,X) will be a candidate equilibrium in view
of Proposition 3.1 once we show that U(G) is a true FM -martingale. The
following theorem gives such an X .
Theorem 5.1. Let H and p be the functions defined in Theorem 4.1.
Then there exists a unique process (Yt)t∈[0,1) which solves
dYt = σ dBt +
{
−σ
2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt) + σ
2 py
p
(t, Yt; 1,H
−1(1, V ))
}
dt,
(5.1)
t ∈ [0, T ],
for all T < 1. Moreover, Y is a (Pv,FI)-semimartingale with Pv(limt→1 Yt =
H−1(1, V )) = 1 for every v ∈ f(R) and
dYt = σ dB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt)dt, t ∈ [0,1]
under FM .
Proof. We will first show that there exists a unique weak solution to
(5.1) on [0, T ] for any T < 1. Then Proposition IX.3.2 in [39] will imply the
uniqueness of strong solutions since if Y 1 and Y 2 are two strong solutions,
then Y 1 − Y 2 satisfies
Y 1t − Y 2t =
∫ t
0
b(s,Y 1s , Y
2
s , V )ds
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for some deterministic function b and, therefore, its local time process at level
0 is identically 0. The strong uniqueness combined with a weak solution will
lead to the existence of a unique strong solution by a result due to Yamada
and Watanabe (see Corollary 5.3.23 in [26]). To show the existence of a weak
solution, fix T < 1 and let Nt := p(t, ζt; 1,H
−1(1, v)) for t≤ T where v ∈ R
and ζ is the unique strong solution of
dζt = σ dβt − σ
2ρ
2N
ζtHy(t, ζt)dt
on [0,1] under a probability measure P˜, where β is a P˜-Brownian motion as
established in Theorem 4.1. The same theorem also gives p as the transition
density of ζ . Then (Nt)t∈[0,T ] is a strictly positive and bounded martingale
with respect to the natural filtration of ζ as a consequence of Itoˆ formula
and the estimates on p obtained in (4.14). Thus, NTN0 has expectation 1 under
P˜ and defines an equivalent change of measure on the σ-algebra FζT . Since
dNt = σNt
py
p
(t, ζt; 1,H
−1(1, v))dβt,
then it follows from Girsanov’s theorem that under the new measure, QT ,
dζt = σ dWt +
{
−σ
2ρ
2N
ζtHy(t, ζt) + σ
2 py
p
(t, ζt; 1,H
−1(1, v))
}
dt
for some QT -Brownian motion. Thus, ζ , as a solution of the above under QT
is a weak solution of (5.1) on [0, T ]. Moreover, the weak uniqueness holds
since the distribution of ζ under QT has a one-to-one correspondence with
the distribution of ζ under the original measure via the change of measure
martingale p(t, ζt; 1,H
−1(1, v)). More precisely, for any bounded function F
and points 0 = t0 < · · ·< tn = T ,
EQ
T
[F (ζt1 , . . . , ζtn)]
= EP˜
[
F (ζt1 , . . . , ζtn)
p(T, ζT ; 1,H
−1(1, v))
p(0,0; 1,H−1(1, v))
]
(5.2)
=
∫
R
· · ·
∫
R
F (y1, . . . , yn)
× p(0,0; t1, y1) · · ·p(tn−1, yn−1; tn, yn)p(T, yn; 1,H
−1(1, v))
p(0,0; 1,H−1(1, v))
dy1 · · · dyn.
Hence, we conclude the existence of a unique strong solution, Y T , of (5.1)
over the interval [0, T ] under Pv . Define Y by Yt = Y
T
t 1t≤T and observe that
due to the uniqueness of strong solutions Y is well defined and is the unique
process that solves (5.1).
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND FORWARD–BACKWARD SYSTEMS 29
Next, we want to extend the process Y to time-1 by considering its
limit. This limit exists in view of Theorem 2.2 in [16]. Note that Assump-
tion 2.2 of [16] is satisfied since (t, y) 7→ p(t, y;u, z) is C1,2 on [0, u)×R and
p(t, y;u, z) = q(σ2(u− t), z − y)r(t, y;u, z), where q is the transition density
of standard Brownian motion and r is a strictly positive function with ex-
ponential bounds given by (4.14), which in particular implies p generates a
time inhomogeneous Feller semigroup. Moreover, the same result also yields
Pv(limt→1 Yt =H−1(1, V )) = 1.
To show the semimartingale property of Y let z =H−1(1, v) and recall
from (4.10) that
r(t, y; 1, z)
= EQ
y→z
t→1
[
exp
(
− ρ
2N
∫ 1
t
XsHy(s,Xs)dXs − σ
2ρ2
8N2
∫ 1
t
X2sH
2
y (s,Xs)ds
)]
.
In view of the Markov property of Brownian bridges, we have
r(t,Xt; 1, z)
= EQ
0→z
0→1
[
exp
(
− ρ
2N
∫ 1
t
XsHy(s,Xs)dXs
− σ
2ρ2
8N2
∫ 1
t
X2sH
2
y (s,Xs)ds
)∣∣∣FXt
]
,
where (FX) is the usual augmentation of the natural filtration of X since
both
∫ 1
t XsHy(s,Xs)dXs and
∫ 1
t X
2
sH
2
y (s,Xs)ds are measurable with re-
spect to σ(Xu;u∈ [t,1]).
Therefore,
Lt := r(t,Xt; 1, z) exp
(
− ρ
2N
∫ t
0
XsHy(s,Xs)dXs− σ
2ρ2
8N2
∫ t
0
X2sH
2
y (s,Xs)ds
)
is a Q0→z0→1-martingale. Moreover, it is strictly positive due to (4.12). Thus,
we can define P0,z on FX1 via dP
0,z
dQ0→z0→1
= L1.
Recall that under Q0→z0→1 X solves the following SDE:
Xt = σW
z
t +
∫ t
0
z −Xs
1− s ds,
where W z is a Q0→z0→1-Brownian motion. Thus, a straightforward application
of Girsanov’s theorem yields that X solves (5.1) once B is replaced with the
P0,z-Brownian motion defined by the Girsanov transform since
dLt
Lt
=
(
rx(t,Xt; 1, z)
r(t,Xt; 1, z)
− σρ
2N
XtHy(t,Xt)
)
dW zt .
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Since semimartingale property is preserved under equivalent changes of mea-
sure and the strong uniqueness holds for the solutions of (5.1), we obtain
the desired semimartingale property of its unique solution.
Having shown the semimartingale property it remains to demonstrate the
claimed representation of Y under FM . Suppose that ξ is a solution of
ξt = σβt −
∫ t
0
σ2ρ
2N
ξsHy(s, ξs)ds.(5.3)
Then ξ has the transition density p. If one enlarges the filtration of ξ with
ξ1, then under the enlarged filtration ξ has the following decomposition:
dξt = σ dWt +
{
−σ
2ρ
2N
ξtHy(t, ξt) + σ
2 py
p
(t, ξt; 1, ξ1)
}
dt,
(5.4)
t ∈ [0,1),
where (Wt)t∈[0,1) is a Brownian motion in the enlarged filtration independent
of ξ1 (see Theorem 1.6 in [34]).
On the other hand, since E[ξt|Fξt ] = ξt for t < 1, we must have
σβt −
∫ t
0
σ2ρ
2N
ξsHy(s, ξs)ds= E[σWt|Fξt ] + E
[∫ t
0
σ2
py
p
(s, ξs; 1, ξ1)ds
∣∣∣Fξt
]
−
∫ t
0
σ2ρ
2N
ξsHy(s, ξs)ds.
Since the projection of a martingale onto a smaller filtration is still a martin-
gale, from the above equation we conclude that E[
∫ t
0 σ
2 py
p (s, ξs; 1, ξ1)ds|Fξt ]
is an Fξ-martingale which is equivalent to
E
[∫ u
t
σ2
py
p
(s, ξs; 1, ξ1)ds
∣∣∣Fξt
]
= 0 ∀u ∈ [t,1).(5.5)
Observe that by Theorem 4.1 the distribution of ξ1 and that of H
−1(1, V )
coincide. Since we have established the uniqueness in law of solutions to (5.1)
and V is independent of B, we can conclude that the processes Y and ξ have
the same distribution. Thus, from (5.5) it follows that for u < 1
E
[∫ u
t
σ2
py
p
(s,Ys; 1,H
−1(1, V ))ds
∣∣∣FYt
]
= E
[∫ u
t
σ2
py
p
(s,Ys; 1, Y1)ds
∣∣∣FYt
]
= 0.
The above implies that E[
∫ t
0 σ
2 py
p (s,Ys; 1,H
−1(1, V ))ds|FYt ] is an FY -martingale.
Therefore, Y has the following decomposition with respect to FY :
Yt =Mt −
∫ t
0
σ2ρ
2N
YsHy(s,Ys)ds, t ∈ [0,1),
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where M is an FY -martingale. On the other hand, [M,M ]t = [Y,Y ]t = σ2t.
Thus, by Le´vy’s characterisation, Mt = σB
Y
t . Note that (B
Y
t )t∈[0,1) is a uni-
formly integrable martingale; thus, we can define BY1 = limt→1B
Y
t so that
(BYt )t∈[0,1] is a Brownian motion. This establishes the desired decomposition
on [0,1] as Y converges to a finite limit as t→ 1. 
Theorem 5.1 in conjunction with Proposition 3.1 establish the existence
of an equilibrium in our model.
Theorem 5.2. Let H∗ and p be the functions defined in Theorem 4.1,
and
X∗t =
∫ t
0
{
−σ
2ρ
2N
Y ∗s H
∗
y (s,Y
∗
s ) + σ
2 py
p
(s,Y ∗s ; 1,H
∗−1(1, V ))
}
ds.
Then (H∗,X∗) is an equilibrium.
Moreover, under FM the equilibrium demand evolves as
Y ∗t = σB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
∫ t
0
Y ∗s H
∗
y (s,Y
∗
s )ds.
Proof. Note that H∗ is a bounded function being a solution of heat
equation with a bounded terminal condition. Thus, conditions (2.1) and
(2.2) are automatically satisfied. Moreover, Theorem 5.1 yields that X∗ is a
(P v ,FI)-semimartingale and Pv(H∗(1, Y ∗1 ) = v) = 1. Thus, Proposition 3.1
yields that X is admissible and optimal strategy for the insider given H∗.
Thus, it remains to verify the zero-utility gain condition of the market
makers, that is, to prove that U(G) is an FM -martingale. Recall from The-
orem 5.1 that with this choice of X∗, Y ∗ solves
dYt = σ dB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
YtH
∗
y (t, Yt)dt.(5.6)
Thus, Itoˆ’s formula together with the conditions on H∗ yields
U(Gt) =− exp
(
σρ
N
∫ t
0
Y ∗s H
∗
y (s,Y
∗
s )dB
Y
s −
σ2ρ2
2N2
∫ t
0
(Y ∗s H
∗
y (s,Y
∗
s ))
2 ds
)
.
Clearly, −U(G) is an exponential local martingale.
Next, observe in view of the absolute continuity relationship between the
laws of Y and σW as established in Lemma 4.2 ( 1M∗t
)t∈[0,1] is a strictly
positive P-martingale, where
M∗t = exp
(
− ρ
2N
∫ t
0
Y ∗s Hy(s,Y
∗
s )dYs −
σ2ρ2
8N2
∫ t
0
(Y ∗s Hy(s,Y
∗
s ))
2 ds
)
.
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Therefore, if we define an equivalent measure, Q, on FY ∗1 by dPdQ = 1M∗1 , then
W Y := Y
∗
σ is a Q-Brownian motion. Consequently, U(G) is a P-martingale
if and only if U(G)M∗ is Q-martingale.
On the other hand, a straightforward application of integration by parts
formula yields
d(−U(Gt)M∗t ) =−U(Gt)M∗t
σρ
2N
YtHy(t, Yt)dW
Y
t ,
that is, −U(G)M∗ is the stochastic exponential of ∫ ·0 σρ2N YtHy(t, Yt)dW Yt .
Moreover, ∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
YtHy(t, Yt)dW
Y
t
∣∣∣∣≤K(1 + |W Y1 |)
by (4.5). Since |W Y1 | has all exponential moments, we conclude that−U(G)M∗
is a Q-martingale using Kazamaki’s criterion (see, e.g., Theorem III.44 in
[38]). 
The above theorem shows that the equilibrium demand process has a drift
in its own filtration. This is in contrast with the other possible generalisations
found in the literature (for the change in the pattern of private information
arrival see [5], for a risk averse insider see [8] and for competition among
insiders see [4]) of the original models of [29] and [2] lead to equilibria with
total demand being a martingale in its own filtration.
Moreover, as Hy > 0 the equilibrium total demand process is mean re-
verting. This suggests a theoretical explanation for the emergence of mean
reversion in the specialists’ inventories, which has strong empirical support
(see, e.g., [12, 23, 24] and [33]): The mean reversion appears as a result of
the insider’s reaction to the market maker’s demand for risk sharing. The
speed of mean reversion is not constant and depends on the market makers’
level of effective risk aversion, ρN , as well as the level of informational asym-
metry, σ, in a nontrivial way due to the definition of Hy. This theoretical
implication is in line with the empirical findings of [23] who observe that
the speed of mean reversion depends on the inventory levels of the market
makers in the London Stock Exchange.
Closely related to the observation that the total order has a drift, is the
fact that the equilibrium price is no longer a martingale under the phys-
ical measure. Moreover, Y ∗ and, therefore, H∗(t, Y ∗t ) are mean-reverting
processes. This mean-reversion property of Y ∗ also entails that Kyle’s con-
clusion of constant market depth, which is the order size necessary to move
the prices by one unit, does not hold in this model. Indeed,
dH∗y (t, Y
∗
t ) =H
∗
yy(t, Y
∗
t )σ dB
Y
t −
σ2ρ
2N
Y ∗t H
∗
y (t, Y
∗
t )H
∗
yy(t, Y
∗
t )dt
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implies that H∗y (t, Y ∗t ) is not a martingale since H∗ is not linear. In particu-
lar, if H∗ is such that H∗yy(1, y) =−H∗yy(1,−y) with H∗yy(1, y)≤ 0 for y ≥ 0,
then yH∗yy(t, y) ≤ 0, and thus H∗y (t, Y ∗t ) is a submartingale. Consequently,
E[H∗y (t, Y ∗t )] has an upward slope, that is, the executions costs increase in
time in our model. This is consistent with the empirical findings of U-shaped
patterns of execution costs on NYSE (see [32]).
6. Conclusion and further remarks. We have solved a long-standing open
problem first posed by Subrahmanyam in [40] of existence of an equilibrium
in a financial market with asymmetrically informed traders and risk averse
market makers in a continuous-time version of a model first introduced by
Kyle [29]. The equilibrium turns out to be the solution of a nonstandard
FBSDE. We have solved this FBSDE by transforming it into a forward–
backward system of stochastic and partial differential equations and em-
ploying a novel application of Schauder’s fixed-point theorem.
Consistent with the empirical studies on the inventories of market makers
we find that the risk aversion of market makers causes mean reversion in the
equilibrium total demand (i.e., collective inventory of the market makers).
This implies that the informed trader’s strategy ceases to be inconspicuous
and, therefore, provides the first example of an equilibrium in a Kyle-type
model which does not satisfy inconspicuousness condition. The driving force
behind this result is that the risk aversion of market makers makes them
unwilling to bear risk. Instead of paying the extra compensation for the
inventory risk, the informed trader chooses to absorb a part of large fluc-
tuations in the market makers’ inventories, that is, participates in a risk
sharing.
We also show that the sensitivity of prices to the total order, which is the
reciprocal of the market depth, can be a sub-martingale for certain model
parameters. This implies that the execution costs are, on average, increasing
toward the end of a trading period, which is consistent with the empirical
results obtained in [32].
Whereas, for general set of the parameters, the reciprocal of the market
depth is not a sub-martingale, it is not a martingale either. This theoretical
conclusion is in discord with the results obtained in [29], as well as in [8],
who studies the effect of risk averse insider on the equilibrium, and in [5],
who extend Kyle’s model to the case when the informed trader receives a
fluctuating signal over time. In fact, Kyle in [29] made a conjecture that:
[· · ·] neither increasing nor decreasing depth is consistent with behavior by the
informed trader which is “stable” enough to sustain an equilibrium. If depth
ever increases, the insider wants to destabilize prices (before the increase in
depth) to generate unbounded profits. If depth ever decreases, the insider
wants to incorporate all of his private information into the price immediately.
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Thus, the results obtained from our model demonstrate that the necessity
of risk sharing between the informed trader and the market makers makes
exploitation of systematic movements in market depth unprofitable for the
informed trader. Indeed, if the trader attempts to follow the strategy out-
lined by Kyle, that is, acquiring a large position when depth is lower in
order to liquidate at more favourable price when depth is higher, she would
be moving the total order away from its mean, leaving the market makers
exposed to the risk of large orders. Violation of risk sharing would cause the
market makers to adjust the prices eliminating favourable liquidation op-
portunities for the informed trader. Thus, contrary to Kyle, such a strategy
does not lead to unbounded profits.
Moreover, the appearance of systematic changes in market depth as a
result of market makers’ risk aversion demonstrates that competition of the
informed traders, as in [4], is not the only possible mechanism that can make
the strategy proposed by Kyle unprofitable, thus leading to a drift in the
reciprocal of the market depth.
These observations show that a mere introduction of risk averse market
makers to the setting of [29] changes the equilibrium outcome fundamentally.
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